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Abstract: Law 46/1999 incorporated formal water markets into the Spanish legal and 
regulatory framework, allowing spot water markets and the creation of water banks. The 
implementation of water markets in Spain aimed at improving the efficiency of water use 
by reallocating water towards uses with higher added value. However, the performance of 
water markets in Spain has been rather disappointing, since they have been operative only 
during drought periods, and even under these extreme scarcity situations, trading activity 
counted for less than 5.0% of total water use. The narrowness of the market suggests that 
there are some barriers hampering their effective functioning. This paper examines the 
evolution and performance of water markets in Spain, relying on a transaction costs 
analysis framework. This analysis allows the identification of the main factors impeding 
water markets from operating effectively as a water reallocation tool. This analysis also 
provides some guidelines on how to overcome these obstacles and, thus, how to improve 
the efficiency of water use. 
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Over the last two decades, the water economy in Spain has faced significant changes in response to 
the country’s socioeconomic and environmental development. During this period, Spain has become a 
mature water economy, characterized by a high and growing water demand, an intense competition for 
water resources among territories and users, an inelastic long-run water supply, aging water storage 
and delivery infrastructure in need of expensive repair or renovation and significant negative 
externalities associated with water pollution or groundwater salinization. As a consequence of this 
mature phase, most of the eastern and southern river basins in Spain have no margin for satisfying 
further water requests without reducing existing demands [1,2]. 
The transition to a maturing water economy has required changes in water policies, since 
developing new water infrastructures to satisfy increasing water demands (water supply policy) has 
been abandoned in favor of reallocating existing water supplies among users (water demand 
management policy). As is also found in other countries, economic instruments, such as water pricing, 
the modernization of water infrastructures and water markets, are now playing a significant role in 
water demand management policies in Spain, aiming to increase the efficiency of using water 
resources by reallocating water to user/uses with higher added value [3]. 
In most water-scarce Spanish areas, there is a tradition of informal water markets. These informal 
markets take the form of simple agreements between water users to reallocate water and require no 
administrative input or control by authorities [4,5]. The Reformed Water Law [6] has incorporated 
formal water markets into the Spanish legal and regulatory framework. This law includes the 
implementation of spot water markets (formal lease contracts of water rights) and the creation of water 
banks (water exchange centers), allowing water rights holders to temporarily trade water rights. 
The potential benefits of water markets in Spain have thus far been evaluated using simulation 
models and not on the basis of empirical evidence [7–10]. These simulation models for water markets 
have shown that this economic instrument could significantly improve water use efficiency and also 
enhance social welfare. However, these analyses have not considered all of the legal, institutional, 
technical and cultural complexity of water transfers, thus overestimating the benefits gained by the 
implementation of water markets. In fact, since the implementation of the Reformed Water Law  
in 1999, there have been relatively few water transactions, most of them during the drought period 
(2005 to 2008) in a spot market and among agricultural users. This market narrowness makes it 
difficult to evaluate the actual effects of water market implementation [4]. 
In accordance with this situation, the aim of this paper is to address the current gap in the analysis 
of Spanish water markets on the basis of a review of the water trading experience in the country and 
the international existing literature on water markets. This allows us to: (i) identify the potential 
obstacles that have hampered water market performance; and (ii) suggest some reform proposals for 
enhancing water markets in Spain, thus improving the efficiency of water use. For this purpose, the 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction together with a presentation of 
the regulatory basics for water markets in Spain. Next, Section 3 briefly describes the experiences of 
water transfers in Spain since the approval of formal water markets in 1999. Section 4 is devoted to 
identifying the potential barriers that may have affected water markets, by following a transaction costs 
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perspective. Section 5 proposes some reform recommendations for Spanish water markets in order to 
overcome these barriers. Finally, Section 6 concludes, providing the main insights from the study. 
2. Institutional Framework of Water Markets in Spain 
With the approval of Law 46/1999 [6], formal water markets were introduced in Spain via the 
implementation of spot water markets and water banks. Consequently, this law established the legal 
framework to allow water transfers between users. Both spot water markets and water banks were later 
consolidated into the Refunded Text of the Water Law, Executive Order 1/2001 [11], which approved 
the Revised Text of the Water Law (RTWL) under the title “Transfer of rights for private water use”. 
According to Spanish law, all water resources are in the public domain, and consequently, any 
private water use is subject to an administrative authorization or a legal concession (water use right), 
generally granted for 75 years. Nonetheless, the law allowed groundwater users to keep their private 
rights over groundwater if registered before 1985. Moreover, it is worth differentiating between water 
use rights (or concessions) and water effectively delivered to users (water allocation), which will 
depend on total water availability for the current hydrological year. Thus, the water volume specified 
in water rights is only available for users in average or wet hydrologic years, when total water 
availability is higher than aggregated water rights. In case of scarcity (drought years), available water 
resources are prioritized, with domestic water use served first. For economic uses, such as irrigation or 
industry, water resources are allocated proportionally in times of scarcity. 
The main provisions included in the 2001 RTWL that regulate water markets in Spain are 
summarized below [12–15]: 
• Aim of transfers: According to the law, only temporary trading of water rights (formal lease 
contracts and water exchange centers) is permitted (permanent transfers of water rights are not 
allowed). Notwithstanding, the urgent measures adopted to palliate the effects of drought on 
urban and irrigation areas in specific river basins, Royal Decree-Law (RDL) 9/2006 [16] and 
the urgent environmental measures, RDL 17/2012 [17] established some exceptions. The first 
RDL allowed water exchange centers to permanently acquire water use rights for environmental 
purposes at a fixed price, provided that this option was exceptionally approved by the 
government, while the second RDL introduced the possibility of permanently traded water 
rights by certain users in the Guadiana basin. 
• Users allowed leasing water rights: Users participating in a formal lease contract (i.e., buyers 
and sellers) must be legal holders of water use rights. 
• Time and volume restrictions: The duration of formal lease contracts will be determined by the 
buyer and the seller, as long as the duration is equal to or less than the remaining duration of 
the water use right of the seller. In addition, any holder of water use rights will be able to 
transfer water, as long as the transferred volume does not exceed the average volume actually 
used during the five years prior to signing the formal lease contract. For consumptive water 
uses, such as irrigation, the maximum tradable water is the average volume of water actually 
consumed. This effective consumption is calculated as the difference between the volume of 
water extracted from the source and the return flows, taking into account the efficiency in the 
transportation, distribution and crop watering [18–20]. Regardless of the average volume of 
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water actually used, the volume of water transferred cannot exceed the amount of water allocated 
by the corresponding River Basin Authorities (RBA) on the basis of the hydrological year. 
• Restrictions based on water use: There are two requisites to participate in water markets in 
Spain. First, the potential water seller can only lease water use rights to other holders with 
equivalent or higher priority in the order of preference established in Article 60 of the 2001 
RTWL or according to the corresponding River Basin Management Plan. Domestic uses have 
the highest priority, followed by agricultural, industrial and other economic uses, such as 
aquaculture, recreational uses or transportation. Secondly, holders of non-consumptive water 
use rights (i.e., hydrological uses) cannot sell their rights to holders of consumptive water use 
rights (i.e., irrigation). 
• Water authorities’ intervention: The execution of a formal lease contract between users of the 
same river basin requires prior authorization by the corresponding RBA. A tacit consent period 
of two months has been established for this type of contract (i.e., if no administrative resolution 
contrary to a formal lease contract is approved in two months, the contract is automatically 
authorized). During this period, the RBA may exercise a preferential acquisition right over the 
water volume to be transferred (right to repurchase). For contracts between users from different 
river basins, the required authorization is provided by the Spanish Ministry of Environment, 
and the tacit consent period is longer (four months). 
• Pricing formal lease contracts: The price in the formal lease contract is freely agreed upon by 
the buyer and the seller and must be explicitly included in the contract. However, Spanish law 
includes the possibility of setting a price limit according to the “market situation and  
its imperfections”. 
• Water exchange centers (WEC): Spanish water law also includes the creation of water banks as 
an alternative to spot markets (leasing of water rights). Water banks operate in exceptional 
circumstances, such as severe water shortage periods or droughts. In these situations, RBAs 
may launch a bid for the temporary acquisition of water use rights at a fixed price (Offers of 
Public Purchase of Water Rights (OPPWR)) and then redistribute water volumes among potential 
users at a fixed price or even for free. As mentioned above, only in some exceptional cases, the 
government approves WEC to permanently acquire water use rights for environmental purposes. 
3. Water Markets: Experiences in Spain 
Water markets were introduced in Spain in 1999, and the first water transfers between users were 
registered one year later. However, the majority of water transfers took place between 2005 and 2008, 
when Spain suffered a severe drought. Experiences of intrabasin and interbasin water transfers and the 
role of water banks (WEC) in Spain are included below in more detail. Figure 1 shows the location of 
the major water transfers in Spain. 
3.1. Intrabasin Water Transfers Examples 
One of the most significant formal lease contracts was signed in 2002 between the Community of 
Irrigators (CI) Canal de Henares in Madrid (seller) and Aguas del Sorbe (buyer), a consortium for 
domestic water supply. They agreed to transfer 20 hm3 per year in order to increase water availability 
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for urban uses (please consider the following equivalence of measurement units: 1 cubic hectometer 
(hm3) = 1 gigaliter = 1 million cubic meters (Mm3) = 811 acre-feet; and 1 hectare = 2.5 acres). The cost 
of the water transfer consisted of a fixed cost of 38,000 €/year, a variable cost of 0.01 €/m3 for the first 
4 hm3 and 0.02 €/m3 for any subsequent volume transferred. This variable cost increased up to  
0.03 €/m3 during summer periods. Despite the 10-year duration of the formal lease contract, water 
transfers occurred only in 2002 and 2005, accounting for 4 hm3 and 14 hm3, respectively [21]. 
 
Figure 1. Location of water markets in Spain. 
Another formal lease contract worth noting is that signed by CI Pago de la Vega (seller) and Aguas 
de Almanzora (buyer), two agricultural users of the Mediterranean-Andalusian River Basin in 2007.  
A total of 0.9 hm3 were transferred at a price of 0.15 €/m3. In addition, 54 formal lease contracts were 
also authorized within the Segura River Basin between 2000 and 2008. These contracts allowed the 
transfer of 19.01 hm3 [22]. 
To date, the last intrabasin formal lease contract was signed in 2011 by users of the Segura River 
Basin and renewed in 2012. Two cubic hectometers were transferred from the CI of Sangonera and 
Campo Tejar to the CI of Pulpí, at a price of 0.20 €/m3 and assuming the pumping costs. 
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3.2. Interbasin Water Transfers 
Most of the formal lease contracts were signed between users located in different river basins 
(interbasin water transfers), requiring an additional license by the Ministry of Environment for the use 
of public infrastructures connecting those basins. 
In December, 2006, a transfer of 1.08 hm3 of water was approved between two large farms in 
downstream Guadalquivir River and Aguas de Almanzora, a consortium of 18 CIs located in the 
Mediterranean-Andalusian River Basin. Aguas de Almanzora also bought rice farm lands close to the 
mouth of the Guadalquivir, with the aim of acquiring the water use rights allocated to those lands 
permanently. These acquisitions allowed Aguas de Almanzora to sign formal lease contracts with itself 
(i.e., it was both the seller and buyer) and to transfer 11.97 hm3, 3.9 hm3 and 4 hm3 of water in 2006, 
2007 and 2008, respectively. Water was transferred from the downstream Guadalquivir River Basin to 
irrigate citrus trees and vegetables in northern Almeria (in the Mediterranean-Andalusian River Basin). 
Since this was an exceptional case in which the seller and the buyer were the same, no water price was 
included in the formal lease contract. However, considering that the average purchase price for the rice 
farms was 24,000 €/ha, the corresponding average water price was equivalent to 0.18 €/m3 [23].  
In addition, Aguas de Almanzora bought water from other CIs in 2007 and 2008: (1) 8 hm3/year from 
CI Genil Cabra; (2) 5 hm3/year from CI Guadalmellato; and (3) 4.31 and 12 hm3 from CI Bembézar 
left bank and CI Bembézar right bank, respectively, in 2007. The prices for all of these transfers were 
about 0.18 €/m3. 
The most important water transfers occurred from the Tagus River Basin to the Segura River Basin. 
More specifically, the CI Canal de Estremera (upstream river Tagus) transferred water to a consortium 
of different CIs in southeastern Spain (Segura River Basin) called Sindicato Central de Regantes del 
Acueducto Tajo-Segura (SCRATS). An average volume of 31.05 hm3/year was transferred during 
2006–2008 at a price of 0.19 €/m3 in 2006 and 0.22 €/m3 in 2007 and 2008. Another water transfer 
worth mentioning is the transfer from the CI Canal de las Aves (Tagus River Basin) to the consortium 
Canales del Taibilla, which is responsible for supplying drinking water to more than 2.5 million people 
in 80 municipalities in the Segura River Basin. In this case, three formal lease contracts were signed  
in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The water effectively transferred was 1.18 hm3, 8.50 hm3 and 36.90 hm3, 
respectively, at an average price of 0.27 €/m3. 
Water transfers from agricultural users in the Jucar River Basin (Unidad Sindical de Usuarios del 
Júcar, USUJ) to a hydropower company (Iberdrola) and to the consortium, Canales del Taibilla, have 
also been taking place since 2001. These contracts cannot be considered formal lease contracts, but 
both the purpose and the procedure were similar. Water transfers started in 2001, with volumes ranging 
from 6 to 12 hm3 per year. No water price was set, but the water buyer assumed the costs for:  
(1) transporting water via state-owned public water infrastructures (i.e., regulation and water use  
rates); (2) groundwater pumping as a consequence of reducing USUJ’s surface water availability;  
(3) compensation to hydrologic users for diminishing water flows; and (4) transporting water via 
infrastructure connecting river basins. The total cost was estimated at 0.25 €/m3 [21]. 
Finally, there has been an agreement in place between the CI Illana-Leganiel (Tagus River Basin) 
and SCRATS [24] (Segura River Basin) since 2011. This contract will be in effect for ten years, 
committing the former to sell the latter a maximum volume of 10.2 hm3 per year, as required by 
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SCRATS, at a fixed price of 0.06 €/m3. It also commits the buyer to pay the water tariffs charged to the 
CI by the RBA every year. This agreement can be seen as an option contract, which is not specifically 
included in the water law, but neither is it prohibited. In option contracts, the buyer has the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy the water at a future date at a pre-set price (strike price). In order to secure 
this option, the buyer pays an option fee to the seller for this right, regardless of whether the water is 
transferred or not. In this respect, the agreement between the CI Illana-Leganiel and SCRATS can be 
considered the first option contract signed in Spain. 
3.3. Water Exchange Centers 
The creation of WEC or water banks is considered an exception according to the Spanish water law, 
as they can only be implemented in the case of severe droughts or overexploitation of aquifers and 
only in specified river basins. 
For the implementation of WEC, four offers of OPPWR were launched between 2006 and 2008 in 
order to increase the Jucar River stream flow (water purchases from irrigation to environmental uses). 
The first offer, in December, 2006, had a budget of 12 M€ and offered farmers the option to lease their 
water use rights for one year at a price ranging from 0.13 €/m3 to 0.19 €/m3. There were a further three 
OPPWRs, with budgets of 12 M€, 5 M€ and 5.5 M€ in December 2007, February 2008 and March 2008. 
These offers leased water use rights for 80 hm3, 1 hm3 and 27.5 hm3 [25]. 
Another three OPPWRs were established in 2006 and 2007 in the Guadiana River Basin, and they 
aimed to reorganize water uses in the basin and to address the problems of the overexploitation of 
some aquifers. In this case, the WEC aimed to acquire water use rights from irrigators and to 
permanently transfer them to environmental uses. Prices varied from 3,000 € per each irrigation 
hectare converted to dryland farming to a maximum of 6,000 €/ha and 10,000 €/ha, depending on the 
presence of permanent or temporary crops, respectively. Offers were prioritized depending on: (1) the 
proximity of the farm to the National Park Tablas de Daimiel (an ecosystem located on an 
overexploited aquifer); and (2) the lowest price per hectare. Through these public offers, water use 
rights for 9.76 hm3 were purchased, with a total budget of 22.28 M€. Later, in 2008 and 2009, three 
new OPPWRs were established to acquire water use rights for 18 hm3 at a total cost of 42.33 M€. 
According to the total water rights bought and their cost, the average price paid to water right holders 
was 0.12 €/m3. 
Finally, there were two OPPWRs in the Segura River Basin in 2007 and 2008. The WEC provided 
offers to farmers upstream in the basin for the temporary acquisition of water use rights in order to 
reduce the effects of the drought. Water was transferred from agricultural uses to domestic and 
environmental uses at an average price of 0.16 €/m3. 
3.4. Aggregated Transfers 
The number of both water market exchanges and users participating in the market has not been very 
significant in absolute terms in Spain. In addition, most of the formal lease contracts have transferred 
water to river basins located in the southeast of Spain (Segura and Mediterranean-Andalusian River 
Basins) from other river basins connected by public infrastructures (Tagus, Guadalquivir and Jucar 
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River Basins). This low number of users participating in water markets and their location makes the 
Spanish water market quite “narrow”. 
While the number of water market exchanges has been limited, the volume of water transferred is 
significant, at least in water-scarce years (drought period from 2005 to 2008). The existing difference 
in trade volume between normal and dry years in Spain is shown in Table 1. More specifically, Table 2 
shows the volume of water transferred and used per river basin in 2007, the year when the greatest 
number of water exchanges was registered due to the last drought in Spain. 
Table 1. Total trade volume through water markets under drought and normal  
conditions (hm3). OPPWR, Offers of Public Purchase of Water Rights. 








Intrabasin Transfers 46.66 77.99 31.7 156.35 
Interbasin Transfers 204.34 31.05 235.39 
OPPWRs 198.34 198.34 
Total 46.66 480.67 62.75 590.08 
Note: Source: Authors’ own elaboration from data in Palomo-Hierro and Gómez-Limón [26]. 


















Water Use (%) 
Guadalquivir 3,790.47 (−) 33.21  33.21 0.88% 
Guadiana 2,261.92 9.52 9.52 0.42% 
Jucar 3,138.55 (−) 6.10 136.00 142.10 4.53% 
Segura 1,820.83 0.71 (+) 74.50 3.00 78.21 4.30% 
Mediterranean-Andalusian 1,337.78 0.90 (+) 33.21  34.11 2.55% 
Tagus 2,830.00 (−) 68.40  68.40 2.42% 
Rest of river basins 16,444.06  0.00% 
Total Spain 31,623.61 1.61 107.71 138.52 247.84 0.78% 
Notes: Source: Authors’ own elaboration; a own calculations by using the annual gross water demand data 
included in the Water Management Plans of the different river basins and the water use data published by the 
Spanish National Statistics Institute; b positive signs show that the river basin imports water through water 
markets, whereas negative signs show that the river basin exports water. 
According to Table 2, the Tagus River Basin transferred the greatest volume of water (2.4% of its 
annual water use in 2007), while the Segura and Mediterranean-Andalusian River Basins are the main 
buyers of water (4.3% and 2.5% of their annual use in 2007, respectively). Interbasin transfers are the 
most significant, and intrabasin transfers are of limited relevance in the purchasing river basins. WEC 
also played an important role in water reallocation, in particular in the Jucar River Basin, with transfers 
accounting for 4.0% of its annual use in 2007. 
The data show that despite the relatively low significance of water transfers for the whole country 
(0.78% of total water use in a dry year, such as in 2007), markets may be quite relevant at the basin 
level. That relevance only happens in drought periods, such as in 2005–2008, since the number of 
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water transfers is almost insignificant in wet years (i.e., 2010 or 2011). Therefore, under scarcity 
conditions, Spanish experience has shown that water markets are an effective tool for reallocating 
water resources to those uses with the highest economic value. The effectiveness of water markets is 
also reported in other countries, such as Australia, USA, Chile and South Africa [27]. In drought 
circumstances, Australia and Chile transferred more than 20% of their total water use by using water 
markets [28,29]. In California, water transferred using water markets was less, around 5% of the total 
water use in the region [30], showing a similar percentage to the water transfer rate registered in the 
Spanish south-eastern river basins. In other countries where water markets were recently implemented, 
such as South Africa, water transfers do not exceed 1% of the water use in any case [27]. 
Together with the previous conclusions, it must be highlighted that the lack of Spanish data to 
quantify the economic, social and environmental impacts of water transfers makes it difficult to 
faithfully assess whether formal lease contracts achieved their economic efficiency goals. Nevertheless, the 
significant volumes of water transferred from central Spain to the southeast and the water productivity 
difference between these territories allows us to assume that relevant improvements in water allocative 
efficiency have taken place, resulting in both higher aggregated incomes and job creation or job 
maintenance. However, water transfers may also involve some drawbacks, such as the negative impact 
on the rural development of the regions of origin (i.e., reductions in labor and economic activity due to 
the substitution of irrigated crops by rain-fed crops) and the environmental effects (changes in natural 
water flows and their ecosystems, increased contamination in areas of destination due to the 
intensification of agricultural activities). 
WEC have also helped to reallocate water resources with remarkable environmental benefits  
(i.e., reduced water extraction in the case of overexploitation). However, as previously mentioned, an  
in-depth analysis of the role of water banks is still required to evaluate the potential socio-economic 
impacts of this water management instrument. 
4. Main Weaknesses of Water Markets in Spain 
The narrowness of water market activity in Spain, except in drought periods, may be caused by a 
number of factors, such as legal, administrative, cultural, psychological and technical difficulties, as 
well as geographical barriers [31–34]. All of these weaknesses lead us to assume the existence of high 
transaction costs, which are likely to reduce the number of mutually beneficial transactions and, 
thereby, the number of water trades that take place, causing a difference between the potential and 
actual water market activity. 
A detailed discussion of different definitions of transaction costs can be found in Garrick et al. (2013), 
McCann and Easter (2004) and Marshall (2013) [35–37]. The definition used in this study is that 
provided by McCann et al. [38] defining transaction costs as “the cost of resources used to create and 
use a policy through defining, establishing, maintaining and transferring property rights”. This definition 
has been updated by Marshall [37,39] by including the cost borne to change organizations and 
institutions and to define the problems that these institutions and organizations are intended to solve. 
Although these costs are not available for water markets and related institutions in Spain, it is possible 
to determine the factors affecting the magnitude of transaction costs associated with the establishment 
and development of water markets. According to McCann and Garrick [40], these factors can be grouped 
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into two categories, physical attributes (i.e., scale, magnitude of change needed, users heterogeneity, 
excludability, external effects, measurability, potential economies of scale, uncertainty, asset specificity 
(e.g., dams or infrastructures for water transfers that belong to users different from those participating 
in water markets), etc.) and institutional factors (i.e., culture, institutional environment, mismatch of 
physical and administrative boundaries, lobbying, property rights definition, market structures, existing 
law and policies, intermediaries, etc.), the interactions between both being also important. In addition, 
transaction costs will also depend on the initial design of property rights and the order of the reforms 
approved [41], issues that are addressed in the next section. 
The analysis of the transactions and procedures associated with water trading in Spain permits one 
to analyze the structure and incidence of transactions costs. This analysis offers useful insights about 
those physical and institutional factors that are currently hampering the activity of water markets 
(increasing transaction costs). By identifying those factors, appropriate strategies can be identified in 
order to reduce the transaction costs and to promote higher market activity. Once factors affecting 
transaction costs are identified, they can be classified into three sections, according to the framework 
developed by McCann and Garrick [39,40]. This classification goes from those factors that are more 
amenable to change to those that are less amenable to modification. Any policy reform should be 
focused on the latter [39]. This analysis also allows identifying the necessary and sufficient 
modifications to achieve the desired level of water market activity, as well as the best sequence of  
their implementation. 
Table 3 summarizes the existing relations between factors affecting transaction costs and the 
resulting barriers hampering water market activity. A detailed description of each of these barriers can 
be found in Sections 4.1–4.3. The proposals included in Table 3 to improve water markets in Spain 
will be addressed in Section 5. 
4.1. Barriers More Amenable to Being Overcome 
4.1.1. Lack of Information and Low Market Activity 
Giannoccaro et al. [42] show that farmers’ willingness to participate in water markets increases for 
farmers who are better informed and who have previous trading experiences. As a result of the 
narrowness of water markets in Spain, few farmers have any experience with formal lease contracts or 
WEC. Both the low market activity and the lack of information on formal lease contracts (e.g., water 
prices, volumes transferred or the general conditions of contracts not being made public) produce 
uncertainty among farmers regarding the role of water markets in allocating resources. 
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Table 3. Relationship among physical and institutional factors affecting transaction costs, barriers to water trade and design proposals. WEC, 
Water exchange center. 





Proposal for  
Policy Making 







Increasing water  
market transparency 
High fixed transaction costs 
Economies of scale/scope (+),  
intermediaries (+), assets specificity (−),  




Spreading water exchange 
centers; spreading water 
market functioning 
Creating WEC only under 
exceptional circumstances and for a 
limited period of time 
Existing law and policies (−), number of  
agents (+), intermediaries (+), behavioral 




Spreading water  
exchange centers 
Lack of basin closure Excludability (−) Institutional Intermediate 
Make the closure of water 
basins official and ban new 
water concessions 
Water rights are still attached to 
land by the concession system 
External effects (−), property rights (−), 
existing law and policies (−) 
Institutional Intermediate 
Regulation of permanent  
water use right markets 
Administrative authority to grant or 
revise water concessions 
Existing law and policies (−), Uncertainty (−) Institutional Intermediate 
Spreading water  
market functioning 
Ranking of water rights and water 
right holder requirement 
External effects (−), property rights (−),  
existing law and policies (−) 
Institutional Intermediate 
Removing restrictions of 
priority uses; removing 
legal right holder 
requirement 
Allocation of water resources under 
drought conditions 
Heterogeneity (−), uncertainty (−),  




Removing priority  
water allocation in  
drought periods 
Lobbying as a nonmarket way to 
obtain additional water resources 
Lobbying (−) Institutional Intermediate 
Make the closure of water 
basins official and ban new 
water concessions 
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Table 3. Cont. 





Proposal for  
Policy Making 
Water market structure  
and imperfections 
Scale (−), market structure (−),  




Spreading water  
exchange centers 
Restrictions on interbasin water 
transfers due to opposition from the 
regions of origin 
Scale (−), physical vs. administrative 
boundaries (−), institutional environment (−), 




Guidelines on the use of 
infrastructures for interbasin 
water transfers 
Communities of irrigators as 
decision units within the 
agricultural sector 
Heterogeneity (−), culture (−),  
Institutional environment (−) 
Institutional Low/intermediate 
Individual participation  
of irrigators 
Farmer’s perceptions and 
preferences 
Culture (−), uncertainty (−) Institutional Low/intermediate Spreading water  
market functioning 
Notes: Source: Author’s own elaboration, adapted from McCann [39] and McCann and Garrick [40]. a Text in bold indicates a stronger effect, and the sign in brackets 
indicates whether the factor has a positive (increasing) or negative (decreasing) effect on transaction costs. 
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4.1.2. High Fixed Transaction Costs 
High fixed transaction costs may outweigh any difference in the marginal productivity of water 
between buyer and seller and hamper potential water transfers [43,44]. Although there are no specific 
studies about this issue in Spain, fixed transaction costs are assumed to be high, since only users with 
significant differences in their marginal productivity of water have signed formal lease contracts.  
In fact, most of the water transferred has been from central Spain (extensive crops) to the southeast 
(urban users and horticulture crops). Moreover, the relevance of the transaction costs in Spain can be 
also observed in the volume of water transferred in most of the water market operations, which is 
greater than 1 hm3 in most cases. This fact shows that the only way to afford these high costs is by 
signing large volume transfers (minimizing the average cost per volume unit transferred) [40]. 
4.1.3. Creating WEC Only under Exceptional Circumstances and for a Limited Period of Time 
The implementation of WEC in Spain has been limited, since it requires not only exceptional 
circumstances (i.e., severe droughts), but also a significant budget provision to launch OPPWR.  
Water banks have mainly focused on solving environmental problems. In fact, through WEC, water 
authorities have succeeded in reducing water extractions in overexploited areas by purchasing water 
use rights (temporary or permanent acquisitions). In contrast to what happened in California [45,46], 
water banks in Spain (WEC) did not act as an intermediary between potential buyers and sellers of 
water use rights. 
4.2. Barriers Somewhat Amenable to Being Overcome 
4.2.1. Water Rights are Still Attached to Land by the Concession System 
By implementing formal lease contracts, the 1999 Reformed Water Law aimed to break the links 
between water rights and land rights. However, only formal lease contracts are allowed, and this may 
not be adequate when facing long-term water scarcity situations [45] due to the temporary duration of 
the contracts (spot water market). Water markets in Spain only improve the allocative efficiency of 
water use in particular circumstances, but do not allow permanent increases in water availability for 
users with high marginal productivity of water. 
4.2.2. Administrative Authority to Grant or Revise Water Concessions 
Water authorities grant private water use concessions for a maximum of 75 years, and normally, 
they are extended when this period expires. However, concessions might be revised during their period 
of validity to assess whether water users could satisfy their needs with a lower water supply. In such 
cases, water allotment might be reduced without any compensation. The potential revision of water 
concessions by water authorities introduces uncertainty and a lack of legal surety for water rights 
holders. Users may be dissuaded from leasing their water rights in case these transfers are interpreted 
by water authorities as users having an oversized water concession [47]. In any case, there is little 
evidence about the attitudes and behavior of different stakeholders towards the potential revision of 
water concessions in Spain. This barrier has been only studied by Giannoccaro et al. [42], who find 
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that while more than a half of interviewed stakeholders in the Guadalquivir River Basin were worried 
that their water right could be questioned by water authorities, this concern could not be confirmed in 
the case of farmers. 
4.2.3. Ranking of Water Rights and Water Right Holder Requirement 
Being a legal holder of water rights and having a similar or higher use priority than the seller are 
two mandatory requirements to participate in water markets in Spain. This limitation means that most 
formal lease contracts are signed between farmers or between farmers and urban users (i.e., farmers 
transferring water to domestic users since the latter hold the highest water use priority). This legal 
barrier hampers some potential valuable water transfers between other sectors, such as those between 
agricultural and industrial users (i.e., solar power plants) or recreational users (i.e., golf courses, 
aquatic parks, etc.), regardless of the fact that they are legal water rights holders. 
These legal barriers show the difficulty of merging the existing concessional system and the 
implementation of water markets in Spain. Considering water as a public resource makes the public 
administration promote and control its rational and equitable use. This means limiting private water 
uses according to precise conditions (i.e., the activities that obtain water and the location of the water 
transfers must be previously authorized). This centralized approach to reallocating water resources on 
the basis of public interest is in direct opposition to the decentralized reallocation of the market, based 
on the private interests of market participants. One of the key issues is deciding which of these 
alternative approaches to reallocating water resources (or a combination of both) leads to the greatest 
social welfare in Spain [48]. So far, however, there has not been much empirical evidence collected on  
this issue [49,50]. 
4.2.4. Allocation of Water Resources under Drought Conditions 
Despite water rights including the volume of water that can be used by the rights holder, in case of 
scarcity, water authorities can limit this quantity. In fact, actual water allotments only coincide with the 
amount of water established in water rights under average or wet hydrologic conditions. If the total 
water availability in a river basin were lower than the aggregated volume established in water rights, a 
water distribution system would be implemented. According to Spanish water law, a priority system 
determines the ranking of water users in order to allocate water in times of scarcity. Domestic users are 
ranked first, meaning that their water rights are served first. Once these rights have been fulfilled, the 
remaining water can be delivered to less senior agricultural users. By contrast, within any particular 
type of water use, water resources are shared uniformly amongst all users following a proportional rule. 
It is worth mentioning that the proportional rule for water distribution within a water use can be 
modified during severe droughts. Drought plans (DP) have recently been approved in Spain for each 
river basin, and they include action protocols that minimize the environmental, economic and social 
impacts of severe scarcity conditions. Most of these DP establish that water distribution systems  
under scarcity must include limitations for non-priority uses and must guarantee water to keep the 
population healthy and to irrigate woody crops (fruit trees, olive groves, vineyards, etc.). This means 
that, in terms of water supply guarantee, water rights cannot be considered homogeneous within 
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agricultural use, since woody crops should be irrigated before arable crops (wheat, corn, sugar beet, 
sunflower, cotton, etc.). 
The highest priority given to domestic and woody crop water users under drought conditions may 
discourage them from participating in water markets for two reasons. First, under drought conditions, 
users with higher priority may well presume that their water supply is guaranteed without operating in 
water markets. Secondly, the above-mentioned heterogeneity of water rights depending on the priority 
system confers additional uncertainty to the availability of water resources. Since RBAs are responsible 
for distributing water under scarcity conditions, water users must wait until public allocation decisions 
have been made in order to evaluate whether they should participate in water markets by leasing their 
water rights or by purchasing additional water resources. Analogous results have been found by  
Loch et al. [51] in South Australia, where the prospect of government assistance to horticultural 
farmers to protect permanent crops deterred irrigators from early water buying. 
4.2.5. Lobbying as a Nonmarket Way to Obtain Additional Water Resources 
Water rights granted for free in the past were preserved when water markets were approved. This 
fact has led to disputes between holders owning water rights without any charge and non-holders who 
have to buy water. Because of this, pressure groups of non-holders seek to influence government 
decisions regarding new water allocation and may interfere with the functioning of water markets. 
A number of pressure groups, especially those users located in areas of limited water resources or 
with expansion plans, probably lobby for new water concessions. In fact, in the past, putting 
pressure on government decisions was the only way to obtain new water rights, as water markets 
were not allowed [52]. 
Currently, satisfying new water demands is becoming more difficult in Spain due to the maturity or 
the closure of most of the river basins. In any case, because of the historical and traditional success of 
lobbying [53], water users belonging to these pressure groups may be less incentivized to participate in 
water markets, since they could expect to obtain new water rights for free as a consequence of this 
pressure from lobbyists. In any case, it is worth mentioning that Giannoccaro et al. [42] did not find 
the same evidence in the Guadalquivir River Basin, since they found that potential buyers of water 
rights would not refrain from buying water to put pressure on obtaining new (free) water rights. 
4.3. Barriers Less Amenable to Being Overcome 
4.3.1. Restrictions on Potential Interbasin and Interstate Water Transfers due to Opposition from the 
Regions of Origin 
Formal lease contracts (and consequently, water transfers) require prior authorization by the 
corresponding RBA in the case of intrabasin water transfers and by the Spanish Government in the 
case of interbasin transfers, requiring coordination across state jurisdictions and river basin 
organizations (a mismatch of physical and administrative boundaries). In addition, interbasin water 
transfers require government approval to use the public infrastructure connecting different river basins. 
This authorization-based system resulted in a number of political conflicts among the regional 
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governments, since the regions of origin are usually against water transfers, whereas the regions of 
destination are in favor. 
Political tensions and disputes regarding the authorizations required to approve water transfers have 
hindered the execution of formal lease contracts, in many cases impeding transfers that would improve 
the allocative efficiency of water use (i.e., water transfers from low added value activities in the regions 
of origin (extensive crops) to high added value activities in the destination regions (horticulture crops 
and domestic uses)). An example of political tensions complicating water markets is the case of the 
intended formal lease contract between farmers in the Ebro River Basin (sellers) and urban users of 
Barcelona in the Catalonian River Basins (buyers) during the drought period of 2007–2008. Although 
both parties were willing to exchange water, because of a heated political debate, the government 
authorization needed to use infrastructures connecting both river basins was delayed for several 
months. However, due to the exceptional drought conditions, an urgent solution was provided in order 
to supply drinking water for Barcelona, without waiting for the government authorization. The 
situation was solved by importing water via shiploads from other regions. Thus, no formal lease 
contract was finally celebrated [54,55]. 
4.3.2. Water Market Structure and Imperfections 
The water market structure may also negatively affect market functioning [3,56]. Territory division 
in river basins, in principle, makes water transfers possible only within each river basin. Segmentation 
can be avoided only by building expensive infrastructures connecting different river basins and by 
assuming high water pumping costs (one type of transaction cost). The relatively low size of the 
Spanish river basins and the high costs associated with water transfers are important barriers to the 
successful implementation of water markets. The limitations of the number of potential buyers and 
sellers participating in formal lease contracts because of physical reasons (feasibility of transfers) make 
water markets quite narrow, and they become bilateral oligopolies, where water allocation 
arrangements depend on the users’ negotiation power [57]. These barriers related to market structure 
prevent water markets in Spain from reaching the maximum allocative efficiency of water use, since 
water prices do not reflect water resource scarcity in Spain. In this sense, it is worth noting that water 
prices indicate how much negotiating power each participant has, which results in a non-Pareto 
optimal allocation of water resources. 
4.3.3. Communities of Irrigators as Decision Units within the Agricultural Sector 
According to Spanish water law, water concessions for agricultural uses are given collectively to  
a group of irrigated-land owners who must be organized as a CI. These communities of users are the 
legal holders of water rights and not the individual landowner. This implies that the signing of any 
formal lease contract needs the approval of the corresponding CI. This is an administrative barrier to 
the implementation of water markets, since CI participation usually requires a long and complex 
collective decision-making process. 
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4.3.4. Farmers’ Perceptions and Preferences 
According to Tisdell and Ward [58], optimal market-based reallocation of water may occur only if 
farmers’ social and cultural attitudes are considered in the design and implementation of water markets. 
Giannoccaro et al., and Ortiz and Ceña [42,59,60] show farmers’ resistance to trading water in Spain 
due to both their view of water as a non-tradable common good and the notion that water rights should 
not be separated from land. Cultural barriers have been largely recognized in other countries [31,56], 
suggesting that farmers’ perceptions and preferences play an essential role in discouraging their 
participation in water markets. 
5. Proposals to Improve Water Markets in Spain 
As mentioned above, high transaction costs for water markets in Spain have promoted a low 
number of formal lease contracts, either between particulars or through WECs. However, and despite 
the narrowness of water markets, differences in water productivity between buyers and sellers allowed 
water markets to achieve their targets as an instrument for water reallocation when needed [60]. 
Strategies to reduce transaction costs are an important issue in policy design as water markets 
emerge. This is the case in China and South Africa, where transaction costs are still an important 
barrier to water trading [27]. In other parts of the world where water markets are more developed,  
such as the Western U.S. and Australia, initial impediments have been overcome mainly through  
market-enabling policy reforms on water rights (e.g., unbundling of water rights), monitoring systems 
and trading rules. In Spain, an improved regulatory framework is needed to reduce transaction costs 
and to promote water market activity. This new framework will help to consolidate the role of water 
markets as a resource allocation institution. 
The introduction of market reforms requires considering the magnitude of change that will affect 
technologies, the institutional environment, governance structures or policy designs [40]. Furthermore, 
when deciding about the introduction of reforms, the potential benefits from trading must be balanced 
in relation to the transaction and expenditure costs required. Thus, once the factors that can be changed 
and the barriers more amenable to being overcome versus the factors and barriers that are more 
difficult to change are identified, we propose some insights and ideas that would help to improve the 
functioning of water markets in Spain. As was commented on previously, these proposals are ordered 
in decreasing priority according to their potential to reduce transaction costs compared to the resources 
needed for their implementation and control. These reforms could help to make the Spanish water 
markets more flexible and to overcome some of the problems found in the physical and institutional 
frameworks in which water markets operate. 
5.1. Highest Priority Measures 
5.1.1. Make the Closure of Water Basins Official by Law and Ban New Water Concessions 
Many of the southern and eastern Spanish river basins are either closed or near closure. Water 
demand for consumptive uses exceeds the amount of water available in these basins, mainly due to the 
expansion of irrigated land during the last few decades. This has meant that most recent water rights 
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(water concessions) were granted for new irrigated land, reducing the water guarantee for other users 
in the river basin [53]. In order to avoid further water-granting inflation involving more frequent and 
severe shortage periods, new water demands should be satisfied only by using reallocation water 
mechanisms: administrative procedures (revision of water concessions) or water market implementation. 
Since the former may be costly for the public administration and might cause conflict with water rights 
holders, increasing transaction costs, water markets can be considered the most adequate tool to 
facilitate water reallocation under scarcity conditions. 
Water markets require no additional water rights to be effective in water allocation. Banning new 
water concessions reduces water resource shortage and the loss of water guarantees for current users, 
as well as the requests from pressure groups to obtain new water concessions. Through this ban, all 
users would identify the market as the only way to get additional water resources. 
5.1.2. Spreading Water Exchange Centers 
Contrary to what has actually happened in Spain (until now, WEC have been only implemented to 
purchase water for environmental purposes), WEC should be generally implemented as a system to 
allow permanent or temporary transfers of water use rights. When compared to formal lease contracts, 
the main advantage of WEC is a better supervision of: (i) water demand and supply; (ii) water transfers 
(and potential externalities); and (iii) water price. WEC increase the transparency of water markets and 
reduce the transaction costs and uncertainty associated with water availability [61]. All of these 
benefits suggest the usefulness of implementing WEC as institutions that facilitate the interaction 
between potential buyers and sellers of water rights. 
A regulatory framework would be necessary to promote WEC as regular water markets. Water 
authorities would then be responsible for authorizing water transfers once the potential economic, 
social and environmental impacts of water transfers were supervised. In order to facilitate water rights 
trading, all transfers should be authorized, except those that negatively affect social welfare [53]. 
5.1.3. Increasing Water Markets Transparency 
Searching for information on potential water buyers and sellers, bargaining and enforcement of 
contracts usually imply high transaction costs. In order to promote water transfers through the market, 
transaction costs must be reduced. To do that, first, the water registry in Spain should be made public 
to reduce information asymmetry. The public information provided should include updated 
information on water concessions and would allow potential users to identify water use rights and any 
temporary private water use before negotiating any formal lease contract [62,63]. Since search and 
information costs would be minimized, transaction costs would be reduced. Secondly, the transparency 
of water markets should be improved by publicizing formal lease contracts in a timely fashion, thus 
reducing transaction costs associated with the bargaining process [44]. 
5.1.4. Spreading Water Markets Functioning by River Basin Authorities 
Lack of information and limited trading experience with water markets reduce farmers’ willingness 
to participate in water markets [42]. Some measures are needed to make farmers confident in 
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participating in water markets. Launching information campaigns for the CIs will help farmers better 
understand water market functioning. By spreading water market functioning, RBAs can not only 
reduce farmers’ uncertainty on legal or institutional issues, but also remove any cultural barrier related 
to considering water as a common good that should not be traded [64]. 
5.2. Second Level Measures 
5.2.1. Regulation of Permanent Water Use Rights Markets 
Water use rights linked to land limit the participation of users in water markets, especially those 
users short of water resources willing to purchase new water rights. Since Spanish water law only 
allows temporary transfers of water use rights, structural water shortages can only be overcome by 
using two mechanisms. First, users short of water resources may acquire irrigated lands with their 
water use rights and afterwards sign formal lease contracts with themselves every year. Secondly, 
users may buy irrigated lands and then request the water authority to change their water concession 
(e.g., solar thermal energy producers might buy irrigated lands and subsequently ask for a change  
in water use from crop irrigation to energy production). However, the implementation of these 
mechanisms is not typical, since they involve high transaction costs (irrigated land purchase, 
management and administrative issues and potential review of water concession), as well as a lack of 
legal guarantee. 
As previously mentioned, permanent water use rights trading was allowed temporarily and on an 
exceptional basis by Executive Order 9/2006 through the WEC. The permanent exchange of water use 
rights was only used by the Guadiana RBA to launch an OPPWR to improve the status of bodies  
of water. 
Authorizing regular water rights (permanent) markets would promote water markets as a tool to 
increase water availability in the long run [56]. This would imply that the current Spanish water 
concession system must be withdrawn in closed or closing basins. Consequently, water authorities 
would not take responsibility for granting and reallocating water use rights, but they would supervise 
the functioning of water markets to maximize social welfare (management of environmental and social 
externalities caused by water transfers). 
Permanent water rights markets may cause significant impacts on the population and on the 
environment in areas from which the water is transferred, although there is not much empirical 
evidence in the literature [65,66]. Permanent transfers of water use rights may imply a reduction of 
direct and indirect agricultural employment in the areas of origin [67] and may also cause 
environmental disadvantages due to fluctuations in river flows or groundwater levels, affecting 
biodiversity [50]. However, the potential negative environmental impacts of water markets depend on 
the context, and in some cases, such as in Australia, water markets brought benefits to the  
environment [65]. In any case, water authorities should intervene in order to prevent the potential 
drawbacks of permanent water use rights markets and to establish monetary compensation for those 
users affected by permanent water transfers (environmental and social taxes). 
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5.2.2. Removing Restrictions of Priority Uses in Formal Lease Contracts 
An important barrier to implementing formal lease contracts is complying with the ranking of water 
uses. According to Garrido [68], the ranking of water uses conflicts with the attempt to make the water 
rights regime more flexible. Thus, removing priority uses and/or using conversion factors to address 
imbalance properties between the rights types would improve efficiency in the market. 
Spanish water law includes the possibility of modifying the rank of water uses temporarily and 
under exceptional circumstances, if previously authorized by the Ministry of Environment. Such a 
modification occurred in 2005–2008, during the last drought period, and it aimed at increasing the 
flexibility of water markets to reallocate water resources. This offers a basis to make this exception 
the rule. 
5.2.3. Removing the Requirement of Being a Legal Rights Holder to Participate in Water Markets 
Allowing all users, legal rights holders or not, to participate in water markets is highly recommended 
since the allocative efficiency of water resources would increase. New users with a high marginal 
productivity of water use may participate in the market, which would generate income and create jobs 
without increasing water supply. 
Nevertheless, participation in water markets should be regulated in order to guarantee that including 
new potential buyers would result in welfare improvements for the whole society (i.e., verifying that 
new water uses will not cause significant negative externalities). In addition, speculation in water 
markets should be avoided; for instance, water use rights that have not been used previously (sleeper or 
dozer rights) should be excluded from being sold. Participation of those users that do not hold legal 
water rights could be effective through WEC by limiting their activities to temporary purchases of 
water rights. Therefore, water authorities could supervise not only water rights transfers, but also  
their impacts. 
5.2.4. Removing Priority Water Allocation in Drought Periods 
Water allocation priority under drought conditions given to domestic uses and to woody crops 
within agricultural uses has limited water market functioning during scarcity periods. However, this 
priority is justified because of the negative consequences of droughts on population health and job 
creation; the order of preference has been harmful for the rest of water uses (i.e., decreasing water 
supply without any monetary compensation). In order to reduce the effects of prioritization on  
non-priority uses, the implementation of WEC (water banks) might be useful. According to current 
DPs, water bank implementation should be compulsory in the early warning stages of a drought.  
Water scarcity could then be addressed by reallocating water from low-value towards high-value uses, 
allowing the monetary remuneration of those users that agree to give up part of their water allotment. 
This market mechanism both increases social welfare and makes users aware of the importance of 
reducing water demand to mitigate the impacts of the drought [69]. 
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5.3. Other Recommendations 
5.3.1. Guidelines on the Use of Infrastructures for Interbasin Water Transfers 
As mentioned in Section 3, most water transfers in Spain have been implemented between users 
located in different river basins during the scarcity period 2005–2008. A number of Executive Orders 
were published during this drought period to regulate the use of public infrastructures connecting 
different river basins. According to these orders, interbasin formal lease contracts were exempted  
from paying fees and taxes for using public infrastructures. The exemption of transportation costs 
contradicts the cost recovery principle and correct market functioning and, therefore, should be 
amended. All participants in water markets must consider the total costs of water services, preventing 
any additional cost for taxpayers [70]. 
5.3.2. Individual Participation of Irrigators in Water Markets 
As previously mentioned, participating in water markets requires users to be legal holders of water 
use rights. This is also a barrier for those users belonging to a CI, since they cannot participate 
individually in water markets to buy or sell water rights (i.e., CI users do not hold any water rights 
individually). Thus, if an irrigator wants to operate in the market, she/he needs the authorization of the 
CI, and usually, that authorization is not given. For efficiency’s sake, each irrigator should be able to 
participate in water markets by trading his/her own quota of water. However, regulating individual 
irrigators’ participation in water markets is necessary in any case to avoid both internal conflicts within 
the CI and the deterioration of the common management of irrigation water. For instance, some guidelines 
should be established to compensate the CI for the additional costs of individual water trading, e.g., the 
loss of any surplus from the excess of variable charges over the variable cost, and to ban any water 
transfer that jeopardizes the common interest of the CI [71]. 
6. Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
In the past few decades, water markets have been proposed as a policy instrument to improve the 
efficiency of water use, becoming an effective and relevant mechanism in addressing water shortage 
problems in different regions of Australia, California and Chile [3,72–75]; indeed, by providing a price 
for water markets to make the opportunity cost of water explicit to users, promoting voluntary transfers 
from less efficient users to those who could use water more productively and providing incentives for 
irrigators and other water users to preserve water and adopt water-saving technologies [76,77]. 
In Spain, the performance of water markets falls short of this theoretical ideal. Since they were 
introduced, water markets have been operative only during drought periods, and even under this 
extreme situation, trading activity counted for less than 5.0% of total water use. Indeed, it has been 
only under these scarcity circumstances when water markets have seemed to be an effective tool to 
reallocate water resources, from low added value uses in central Spain or downstream of the 
Guadalquivir River, to urban or agricultural high added value uses in southeastern Spain. 
Moreover, water markets should be evaluated not only on the basis of economic efficiency, but on 
social and environmental sustainability bases [27]. However, an integrated assessment about the 
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performance of water markets in Spain is not available. Thus, an in-depth analysis of the economic, 
social and environmental impacts would be necessary in order to evaluate the water markets’ effects on 
social welfare, as has been conducted in Australia by Edwards et al., NWC and Wheeler et al. [78–80]. 
The narrowness of the water markets in Spain suggests that there are some barriers and restrictions 
in their functioning, which lead us to assume the existence of high transaction costs. In this context, 
this paper examined the evolution and performance of water markets in Spain to determine the main 
factors affecting transactions costs. A transaction cost framework analysis has been used, allowing us 
to differentiate those physical and institutional factors that are more amenable to change from those 
showing a greater resistance and providing a comprehensive and logical structure for the evaluation 
and ranking of the proposals to improve water market functioning. 
In sum, the research reported in this paper confirms the need of additional and sustained action, 
observing considerable room for improvement in the water market functioning in Spain before 
reaching maturity. However, it also highlights that the transaction costs of the different options to 
remove market barriers need to be carefully considered before making any decision, as well as the 
order and implementation of these options. According to this, the main suggested proposals for water 
market expansion in Spain mainly imply: (i) making the closure of water basins official by law and 
banning new water concessions; and (ii) promoting the joint performance of WECs and water markets 
with increased water market transparency. 
Finally, it is presumed that Spain could certainly benefit from the experience of other countries in 
water markets, like Australia or the USA (California). Thus, future research should identify the 
relevant lessons for Spain from countries where water markets are well developed. Australian water 
markets, and MDB in particular, appear to be perfect alternatives for lesson-drawing, since they are 
considered to be representative case studies for other countries that are planning to establish water 
markets [27,81,82]. 
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